Media Use and Attitudes in Ukraine:
Foundations of a Smart Nation

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Abstract

This brief report provides preliminary findings of a project entitled 'Access to Information and Media Literacy about Politics: A Collaborative Study'. This project focuses on access to trusted sources of information among the Ukrainian population in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine following Russia's full-scale invasion. The study is anchored in a Web-based survey of individuals fielded by Rating Group, based in Kyiv, along with qualitative interviews with individuals who have experience in providing media, online news and information in the Ukraine context. The survey yielded responses from 2,014 individuals, which form the basis of this report, complemented by the information gained from qualitative interviews. A follow-on report will expand on the statistical and qualitative analyses presented here.

This research was conducted by The Portulans Institute in Washington DC as part of a project in partnership with UNESCO and with support from Japan.

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by Olena Goroshko, William H. Dutton, Serhii Dembitskyi, Lisa Chernenko, Nataliia Boiko, and Grant Blank [2]

This report focuses on access to trusted sources of information by the Ukrainian population in the context of an ongoing war in Ukraine following the Russian full-scale invasion. The study is anchored in a Web-based survey of individuals fielded by Rating Group, based in Kyiv, along with qualitative interviews with individuals who have experience providing media, online news and information in the Ukraine context. The survey yielded responses from 2,014 individuals, which form the basis of this report, complemented by the information gained from our qualitative interviews. Key details of the sample, question-naire, and methods are provided in the appendix of this briefing. A full analysis of the project findings will be provided in a forthcoming final report on the project (Dutton et al forthcoming).

Major Patterns and Themes

The following sections briefly indicate key patterns and themes emerging from preliminary analysis of the Ukraine Survey. A final report will add further detail and analytical perspectives, such as efforts to explain variations across users in their trust in and use of different media (Dutton et al forthcoming).

A Nation Online

Ukrainians are well connected online and regularly use the internet and social media as well as more traditional media. The survey respondents were sampled from individuals in Ukraine with mobile phone numbers – approximately 75 percent of the adult population, who could complete an online computer-assisted survey *(see Appendix)*. Given this sampling frame, it is not surprising that most respondents (80%) always or mainly use a smartphone to access news or information online. Nevertheless, this is a high proportion, suggesting a very connected nation.

As we sampled among mobile and smartphone users, we found that nearly all survey respondents in our sample use internet and social media platforms, see *Figure 1*.[3] Only 3 respondents in our sample of 2,014 indicated that they did not use any social media identified in our listed options. The most used social media were Viber (91%), YouTube (86%), and Telegram (86%). Facebook was almost as common, used by over three-quarters (78%) of the respondents. Instagram gained a majority of users (60%), with TikTok (49%) and WhatsApp (48%) attracting just under half of the public. At the lower end of use were Signal (25%) and X/Twitter (12%). Less than two percent noted their use of any other social media platform.

Figure 1. Use of internet and social media sources by platform

Source: Ukraine Portulans Data. N=2,014

In addition, a more pragmatic factor shaping patterns of use may be based on the practical adaptations to the full-scale invasion and its aftermath, particularly with respect to frequent power outages caused by bombings, missile attacks, and drone strikes. Smartphones, being portable and less dependent on stable provision of electric power, are more practical because they are resilient to power cuts, more mobile, and more easily used in shelters or on the move. Even in cities further from the frontlines, habits formed during the initial months of the invasion, such as in relying on smartphones, might well have influenced prevailing high levels of mobile phone use. This could be another way in which the war has shaped media consumption.

War has Raised the Significance of News

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine has dramatically raised the importance of getting news and information. We asked respondents whether they followed the news more, or less, since the start of the war. We asked: "Some people in Ukraine have CHANGED their use of media and information since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. If you think back to before February 2022, would you say you follow the NEWS more or less than before the full-scale invasion?"

Three-fourths (76%) of the respondents indicated that they follow news more than they did before the war *(Figure 2)*. In fact, nearly half (48%) of all respondents said they follow the news 'far more' than before the war began. The war has decidedly fueled greater interest in news. Less than ten percent of respondents say they follow the news less than before the war *(Figure 2)*.

Figure 2. How important is news compared to before the 2022 full-scale invasion?

Source: Ukraine Portulans Data. N=2,014

War Has Changed What Media and News People Follow

Individuals have reconfigured their media consumption since the war began, particularly since the 24 February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. They have moved decidedly away from Russian content. 86 percent indicated that they listen to or view less Russian content than they did before the war. In line with this shift, respondents could complete the questionnaire in Russian or Ukrainian, but only 5 percent of respondents chose to use the Russian language questionnaire. Whether a person uses the Russian language is not necessarily indicative of the use of Russian information sources. However, this reported shift in use could be partly shaped by distrust of, and social stigmas attached to, Russian media and information sources *(see Figure 4 below),* which could be indirectly reflected in dropping the use of Russian.[4] Our qualitative interviews underscore this point, which will be developed further in the final report.

Trust in Different Media

Opinions on trust across a diverse range of media are varied. Small percentages of individuals express 'no trust' or 'full trust' in any source of information – most were neither blindly trusting nor distrustful. However, individuals vary a great deal between those who mostly trust or mostly distrust media with a large proportion of respondents often saying it was difficult to say. We therefore summarized responses by the percentage who said they generally trust versus those who generally distrusted or found it difficult to say *(see Figure 3)*.

Based on the relationships of responses to trust in different media and information sources, we conducted an empirical analysis to see if the use of one media or source is indicative of all, or if there are subsets of sources that are associated with one another. This process identified three sets of media and other information sources within the full set of items described in Figure 3. Individuals who trust or distrust one of the options in each set, are more likely to use other sources in the same set. These are not sets defined by their design features or ownership, for example, but by the interrelationships of the ways respondents report using them. The three sets of media and information sources are: (1) traditional media, including TV, radio, and newspapers; (2) internet media and other information sources, including social media, internet search, the internet in general; and (3) friends and family, separated into sections of *Figure 3*.

Figure 3. Trust in general media and information sources

Source: Ukraine Portulans Data. N=2,014

Figure 3 shows the degree to which the Ukraine public trusts each information source within each of these three types of media. If a person trusts TV news, for example, they are also likely to trust news on the radio and in print media. However, they are neither more nor less likely to trust sources online or trust friends and family as sources.

The table shows that among the more traditional information sources, radio is the most trusted (39%), followed by TV, and print media.

For online sources, the most trusted source, by a significant amount, is online search, which is trusted by over 70 percent of respondents (71%), suggesting that people trust their ability to find their own information online. However, about a third of respondents said they generally trust sources on the internet (36%) and social media (34%).

With respect to trust in these sources, many say it is 'difficult to say' as their trust may depend on which among the many diverse sources that users find online or on social media. The percentage of respondents saying it is 'difficult to say' by source was: TV news (24%), radio news (26%), print news (27%), information on internet sites (38%), online search (19%), social media platforms (36%), and friends and family (16%). Internet and social media sources are the most 'difficult to say' in part because you can find virtually anything online. The two most trusted sources are those that respondents found the least 'difficult to say' – online search and friends and family.

Friends and family are trusted by three-fourths (75%) of respondents, a higher level of trust than any other source, but about the same level as trust in online search. While friends and family can be mediated, particularly during a war that has dispersed many people, their communication is often interpersonal and face-to-face. However, interpersonal communication is a major way in which media and internet content reach their audiences through what was famously called the 'two-step flow' of communication (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955). The role of friends and family and the two-step flow will be further explored in the next section and the final report.

Trust in Specific Media Platforms and Sources

The survey sought a more fine-grained understanding of trust by looking at more specific media categories and information sources, such as local news. That said, any category is open to interpretation by the respondents, such as what they view as 'local news'. It is important to note that survey research is an inherently blunt instrument. What is meant by 'social media', for example, is what the respondent understands by this term. Therefore, readers should not place undue levels of accuracy onto specific responses. For such reasons, the general patterns that emerge, as described below, are more meaningful than answers to any single question.

Figure 4 shows how respondents rated their trust in each. Again, they are grouped by empirically defined sets, based on analysis of their relationships. With more detailed media specified, internet sources divide into two sets, one roughly consisting of more general online platforms, such as Viber and Telegram, and another being 'alternative online sources' that tend to provide some access to primary source material, such as eyewitness accounts and user-generated content – such as an individual's photos of a bombed building site they witnessed – but also sources distant from Ukraine, such as foreign media, which might well post images drawn from social media in Ukraine as well as a foreign correspondent's interpretation of the news. Russian media were added to this list as a separate category, given that Russian media were highlighted by interviews used to develop the questionnaire. Russian media are not associated with using any other media, largely because so few people express any trust in them, so they are separately listed.

This categorization leaves five sets of more specific media and information sources, which are loosely defined as:

01	02	03	04	05
Traditional mass media, including newspapers, TV, and radio	Internet sources: including social media, Telegram, Viber and TikTok	Alternative online sources: including blogs, YouTube, eyewitness accounts, and foreign media *(Russian media are categorized separately)*	Friends & family and neighbors	Russian media

Figure 4. Trust in specific media and information sources

Source: Ukraine Portulans Data. N=2,014

Source: Ukarine UNESCO Portulans Data. N+2,014

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The previous patterns are generally reinforced and expanded by these more detailed options. Traditional media are generally trusted by about one-third of respondents, see *Figure 4*. Exceptions are local news, which is relatively high, with over 60 percent (61%) saying they trust local news. In contrast, print media is relatively low; with only about a quarter of respondents (25%) saying they trust print media. We asked about local TV to avoid underestimating TV if a particular outlet is not referenced. The lower level of trust in 'local TV' compared to 'local news' might indicate that many respondents perceived 'local news' more broadly than TV, including multiple sources. Many respondents might be interpreting 'local news' in the broad sense of news about their local community rather than as local media.

Likewise, internet sources are trusted at about the same level as more traditional sources with about one-third of respondents indicating a general level of trust. The exception is Telegram, which nearly half of the respondents (47%) trust. TikTok garnered less trust, with closer to a tenth of users (14%). Viber is trusted by 32 percent and social media generally is 29 percent. Remarkably, given the controversy surrounding Telegram and its lack of encryption in many situations, Telegram is more trusted by the public than TV, radio, or other broadcasting - except for local news - as a source of information. [5]

Online content from 'alternative online sources' include foreign media, blogs, and eyewitness accounts. Eyewitness media rank about as high as Telegram in public trust, with 46 percent expressing trust in eyewitness accounts. These alternative sources provide more forms of primary information ranging from blogs, video-blogs, eyewitness, and foreign accounts but are often distinguished by their distribution of more user-generated content, with foreign media often being a possible exception when not reporting on interviews or direct observation. The specific source – YouTube – ranks nearly as high, with 41 percent expressing general trust in this platform. Interestingly, foreign media, other than Russian media, also rank high: 55 percent of the public indicate trust, but blogs – among the broadest category and most amateur – rank relatively low at just less than a quarter of the sample (24%).

The most trusted source of information is 'friends and family', with nearly three-fourths (71%) of the public expressing trust. Notably, in contrast, neighbours are ranked decidedly lower, at about one-quarter (26%), despite their physical proximity. So personal face-to-face contact might be less important than personal connections with others in supporting trust in the context of a war.

The least trusted of the sources we queried are Russian media. Less than one percent of the sample indicated they trusted Russian media. Notably, this dramatically low percentage suggests the possibility of a decline since the war, as our qualitative interviews suggested that Russian content played a major role in Ukrainian media viewing in earlier periods and many Ukrainians can speak and read in Russian – meaning that language is not an important barrier. The final report explores the trends overtime in the use of Russian media.

How Do People in Ukraine Get News and Information during Wartime?

In addition to trust in news sources, we asked about the frequency with which individuals get their news from different sources. *Figure 5* shows the average (mean) frequency with which individuals say they access different sources. While these averages are not high, they mask the degree that media are used daily by some and never by others, as shown below *(Table 1)*. Also, it is important to note that it is not always clear where content originates. For example, content on Telegram could be from a user or source in Ukraine, Russia, or another nation. The platform is open to anyone who wants to create a channel.

That said, reinforcing the responses to questions about trust, the most frequently used sources in Ukraine are the internet and social media platforms, such as Telegram and Viber, followed by internet search, followed closely by friends and family, and video platforms, which we grouped with alternative online sources, such as eyewitness accounts. While not surprising, given the levels of trust reported above, print media have the lowest frequency of access by the respondents.

The low ranking of print media could be due to limited trust, their periodic publication, failing to keep pace with rapidly unfolding of events, limited distribution, or their less spontaneous and more edited content. Alternatively, content from print media could be accessed online, leading individuals to underestimate the degree to which they rely on print media. However, the greater perceived reliance on internet and social media compared to traditional media is substantial and likely to reflect changing media habits *(Figure 5)*, such as the growing availability and use of social media.

Figure 5. Average frequency respondents follow news by source

Source: Ukraine Portulans Data. N=2,014

Source: Ukarine UNESCO Portulans Data. N=2,014

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This distinction is further reinforced by looking at the modal responses on the use of different media *(Table 1)*. The most common (modal) response – chosen most frequently by our respondents – is clearly oriented to online social media along with friends and family, which tend to be followed 'daily'. The mode for more traditional media and information sources, including TV and print media, but also more traditional online media, such as online news (often redistribution of print news), email, and even podcasts, tend to be 'never'. These modal distinctions illustrate a tendency for people to make frequent use of media and information sources they prefer – even daily – while not using other media and information sources at all

Table 1. Modal response on frequency of following news sources

Source of News	Modal response	Percent in mode
Channels Telegram/Viber	Daily	46.8
Search	Daily	40.5
Friends and family	Daily	44.0
Video platform	Daily	35.2
Social media	Daily	36.7
TV	Never	30.2
Online news	Never	37.3
Podcasts	Never	44.8
Email	Never	54.7
Print media	Never	60.9
Religious organization	Never	84.3

Where Do People Go First?

A different perspective on how people use media and information sources is through where they go first for different types of information. We asked where they go first for information about a public official, an issue in their neighbourhood or community, and developments in the war *(Figure 6)*. Search dominates all these ways to get information, suggesting that networked individuals tend to trust the information they source personally. But search is particularly dominant when looking for information about a public official, possibly reflecting the ease of finding relevant information through search. Official sources are the second most popular for getting information related to a public official, but they rank third for community issues and the war. Online sources are the second most likely way to find war and community information.

Figure 6. Where would you go first for information about…

Source: Ukraine Portulans Data. N=2,014

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
Public Attitudes About the Media and Information Sources

Variations in trust and use across different media and information sources might be shaped by general attitudes. We asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with various statements about media and information sources, as shown in *Figure 7.* Generally, most of the public tend to be careful in sharing information.

More specifically, *Figure 7* shows the percentage of respondents who agree and disagree with each statement. Most respondents (86%) say they agree that they avoid political gossip, and most (85%) agree that it is risky to share sensitive information with a person they do not know well. Nearly three-fourths (73%) agree that it is best to share sensitive information in person. There is less consensus on whether 'social media is a good source of information' although a majority of respondents (60%) agree, leaving a substantial proportion (40%) who disagree. Social media clearly divides opinion. And there is another clear division over whether 'neighbors are an important source of information' with 50 percent agreeing and 50 percent disagreeing. While a majority of respondents (60%) disagree with the view that email is an important source of information, a substantial proportion (40%) agree. This could reflect the increasing role of 'push media', such as email in many online platforms, such as Telegram, and many online news sites.

Figure 7. Public attitudes about media and other sources of information

Source: Ukraine Portulans Data. N=2,014

Digital Skills

Multimedia and digital skills are relatively good but not perceived to be high and they vary across the population. The respondents self-rated their ability to do things online as generally fair to excellent with less than 5 percent (3.3%) judging their ability to be 'bad', and just over ten percent (12.5%) judge their skills as 'excellent', see *Figure 8*. While a self-rating may seem weak, it has been developed over the years based on the basis that answers are predictive of other more objective indicators of skills.[6] It is remarkable that just over ten percent (12.5%) say their skills are excellent. This may reflect the reliance of most respondents on a smartphone and their limited experience with other devices.

Figure 8. Ability to do things online

Source: 2021: Detecter Media. N=2,018. 2024: Ukraine Portulans Data. N=2,014

Media and Information Literacy: Who Do You Trust?

Media and information literacy (MIL) has been defined broadly by UNESCO to refer to "the set of essential competencies (knowledge, skills, and attitudes) that allow citizens to engage with content providers effectively and develop critical thinking and life-long learning skills for socializing and becoming active citizens" (UNESCO 2021).[7] MIL is likely to be critical to a politically connected community like Ukraine during war, particularly in discussion among themselves, such as in sharing interpretations of the meaning and authenticity of news reports. But in a time of war, it is understandable that people are cautious about who says what to whom. Increasingly, this is a media and information literacy issue. Are users able to judge the authenticity of a wide range of media and information sources of news and related information, such as alerts? How do they do so?

We asked a series of questions about how respondents judged the trustworthiness of news and information. The responses suggest that the people of Ukraine are very focused on judging the value of what they read, listen to, or watch. While about 40 percent of respondents admit they cannot distinguish the trustworthiness of information, the overwhelming majority say they pay attention to many features of media and information that provide some indication of its authenticity.

Specifically, most respondents indicate that they pay attention to the source of news and check other sources. Most individuals also look for different points of view rather than searching for their preferred view. And fully three-quarters (75%) of the respondents say they pay attention to who owns the media*, see Figure 9.*

Figure 9. How respondents judge the trustworthiness of news

Source: Ukraine Portulans Data. N=2,014

Concerns Over Surveillance and Access?

Caution is also reflected in the use of a VPN. Only a third (35%) of respondents said they do not use a VPN, see *Figure 10*. The tendency for most internet and social media users to use a VPN does not necessarily imply any specific motivation behind their use. There are likely to be multiple reasons. It could be a means to reduce their visibility and enhance their privacy online. Based on our qualitative interviews, the use of a VPN in Ukraine is sometimes encouraged by a real or perceived inaccessibility of some sites when using regular browsers, given the potential for governmental or platform blocks on access. For example, many users in Russia are reported to use VPNs to access content blocked by the state, such as YouTube. The use of a VPN can often overcome such problems with access. However, our data do not tell us why most individuals in Ukraine use a VPN. VPNs may well be primarily used to further protect their personal privacy.

Figure 10. Does respondent use a VPN?

Source: Ukraine Portulans Data. N=2,014

Summary and Conclusion: Smart Ukraine

This brief report provides preliminary findings of our study of access to media and information in Ukraine and the public's trust in different sources of information.[8] The findings are based on a survey of Ukraine's adult population conducted in early August 2024. The survey was administered online by Rating Group through a web-based survey of a random sample of 2014 adults who had smartphone numbers (approximately 75% of the population) in Ukraine. The survey population did not include Ukrainian citizens residing in the temporarily Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine.

The findings are preliminary as they are based on univariate statistics of how individuals answered key questions about their use and trust in different sources of information. The reports that will follow this brief preliminary report will utilize more multivariate and comparative analyses to explain variations across individuals, overtime, and cross-nationally. While it is too soon to reach strong conclusions from these preliminary findings, there are clear patterns and themes that emerge from our initial analyses, which are described and documented in this report.

Most generally, we found a public empowered by mobile and smartphone technologies. This is likely to have been driven in part by pragmatic responses to the full-scale invasion, placing value on the mobility of the smartphone. However, mobile and smartphone technologies were also used to source and to check the validity of content from multiple platforms and media. This provided a means for the public to build a higher level of trust in information about the war and politics than if they relied on a single source. Online search was one of the most trusted sources of information. The centrality of online search reflected a general pattern of individuals sourcing information across multiple information and communication channels.

In the weeks following the full-scale invasion, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his team's strategic use of the smartphone enabled them to reach Ukraine and the world in powerful ways. They exemplified 'digital statesmanship' and drew comparisons of the President of Ukraine with Winston Churchill – 'Churchill with an iPhone' (Freedland 2022). In analogous ways, this survey illuminated an entire nation enabled significantly by the creative use of smartphones, and the internet and social media complementing more traditional media and great reliance on friends and family in a heightened two-step flow of communication.

In line with the creative use of media, the war has generated increased public interest in news and information. The survey was conducted in the third year since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and before Ukraine's incursion into Russia's Kursk region (Kursk Oblast). While some in other parts of the world spoke of experiencing fatigue with war reporting or having turned their attention to other conflicts, such as the Israel-Hamas War, most Ukrainians expressed great interest in information and news about the war and related political issues. The war created a thirst for information among most of the population.

Interest in news and information on- and off-line seems to have underpinned a positive level of digital skills as well as practices reflecting media and information literacy among the respondents. Very few rated their ability to use the internet as poor, but neither did many rate themselves as excellent. This may result from most being dependent on smartphones and other mobile phones than on multiple computing devices, such as laptops. In addition, good media and information literacy practices are reflected in strong attitudes that support scrutinizing content, such as fact-checking and understanding the origins and ownership of information content and platforms.

A major example of this scrutiny is a strong rejection of Russian content. While Ukraine has been the target of Russian information operations and related propaganda, the war appears to have undermined a long-standing interest in Russian media and content among Ukrainians. Our qualitative interviews suggested that fewer Ukrainians use the Russian language, watch Russian media, or access Russian information sources. Sources of Russian content are the least trusted by the respondents, when compared to all the other media and information sources. On an absolute basis, rather than comparatively, the respondents did not trust Russian content. This was one major response to Russian disinformation and aggression, particularly following the full-scale invasion.

In additional ways, the public in Ukraine exhibits a learned level of skepticism in all sources of information. Very few respondents express full trust in any single source of information, but very few fully distrust most sources. Instead, there seems to be a healthy level of skepticism toward any source of information, leading individuals to base their understanding of developments from multiple media, information, and communication sources. In this respect, the war is likely to have increased distrust, undermining any taken-for-granted trust in information about the war and politics. Individuals are selective about what they read and listen to but also with whom they discuss politics or the war.

They are cautious in part because communication is increasingly understood as a national security issue – not just an issue of freedom of expression. But there is no evidence of a 'spiral of silence' in Ukraine, as arguably there appears to be in Russia (Noelle-Neumann 1984). There has been no strong consensus since the early weeks following the full-scale invasion, when the public rallied in support of the government and military. However, differing opinions appeared to emerge since these early days, along with differing levels of trust in government and particular public officials. Friends and family are among the most trusted sources of information, more trusted than neighbours, or major media. Sourcing information on and offline and sharing with friends and family seem to be at the core of the emergence of a smart nation.

As noted above, these are preliminary themes and speculations based on our first look at basic patterns in the survey data. The reports that follow will focus on key issues, such as the use of Telegram and other social media in Ukraine, and more multivariate analyses to understand the major variations by demographic factors, such as age or political differences such as interest in politics. We will also be able to draw more from our qualitative interviews and compare our findings with earlier surveys of Ukraine to document trends and with comparable surveys in other nations.

This and later reports will be publicly available with information about their location published on our project web sites at:

The Portulans Institute: *https://portulansinstitute.org/about-the-ukraine-case-studies/* GCSCC: *https://gcscc.ox.ac.uk/ukraine-case-studies*

Bill Dutton's Blog: *https://billdutton.me/about-2/the-ukraine-case-studies/*

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Appendix: Survey Research Methods and Sample

The Ukraine survey was created in English and translated into Ukrainian and Russian. Respondents had the option of completing the Ukrainian or Russian language version of the questionnaire. The full questionnaire is available online at: *https://gcscc.ox.ac.uk/ukraine-case-studies* The survey was conducted by LLC "Rating Group" from August 1 to August 6, 2024, across the entire territory of Ukraine, excluding temporarily occupied regions and areas where Ukrainian mobile communication was unavailable at the time of the survey. The survey involved a two-stage process: CATI (Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing) and CAWI (Computer-Assisted Web Interviewing).

Stage 1 – CATI Recruitment (August 1-5):

A total of 334,045 randomly generated mobile phone numbers, proportionally representing the three largest mobile operators in Ukraine (KYIVSTAR, VODAFONE Ukraine, LIFECELL), were used to recruit respondents. Calls were managed by 66 operators, with follow-up attempts for missed calls or technical failures. Respondents who agreed to participate were then invited to the online survey stage.

Stage 2 – CAWI Survey (August 1-6):

Respondents who consented to participate were sent invitations via Viber, or SMS message if Viber was unavailable, to complete the survey online. The average duration of the survey was approximately 33 minutes. Of the 6,943 respondents initially invited, 4,359 began the questionnaire, and 2,024 completed it, resulting in a response rate of 46.4 percent.

Notes

[2.] Authors are listed in reverse alphabetical order to reflect their diverse but equivalent contributions to this report.

[3] The survey population did not include Ukrainian citizens residing in the temporarily Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine.

[4] This pattern will be explored further to determine whether it is shaped primarily by trust or other factors, such as social norms on language usage or some artifacts of our sample and administration. However, all respondents were offered an opportunity to use a Russian or Ukrainian questionnaire.

[5] We provided a brief blog about this level of trust in Telegram given the dramatic arrest of its founder in France. See: Dutton, W. and Chernenko, L. (2024), Telegram: A Valuable Platform to the People of Ukraine. See: https://billdutton.me/2024/08/29/telegram-a-valuable-platform-to-the-people-of-ukraine/

[6] This self-rating of ability has proven to be very predictive of other more detailed indicators of internet and media skills, such as the ability to create a website.
[7] https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000377068

[8] https://billdutton.me/2024/07/24/media-literacy-and-access-to-trusted-information-during-the-war-in-ukraine/